INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the United States' major environmental statutes in the 1970s and early 198os,' it acted under its constitutional authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 2 At the time, courts and Congress shared an expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause. 3 The idea that there were limits on Congress's Commerce Clause authority was an "intellectual joke," 4 and the standard law school treatment of Commerce Clause powers boiled down to the explanation that "Congress can do whatever it wants." ' However, congressional authority to enact environmental legislation has been called into question by recent Supreme Court cases suggesting that Commerce Clause regulation is valid only if Congress is regulating "economic activity." ' 6 While lower courts applying this new doctrine have held that environmental regulation is valid Commerce Clause regulation, they have had difficulty explaining why. In particular, they have struggled to identify the economic activity regulated by certain environmental statutes.
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is especially vulnerable under the Court's new Commerce Clause analysis. Many environmental statutes may be upheld because they directly regulate industrial activity, which courts regard as sufficiently "economic" for Commerce Clause purposes. 7 This logic is more difficult to apply to the ESA, however, because the statute seeks to protect threatened and endangered species by prohibiting any actions that harm designated species, rather than by regulating specific types of commercial activity. For decades, the wide reach and strict prohibitions of the ESA have generated resistance, 8 and the Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine has created an opening for a wave of legal challenges to the statute. In response to the Court's renewed attention to the economic nature of Commerce Clause legislation, opponents of the ESA have challenged applications of the statute that have only a questionable link to economic activity.
In particular, they argue that Congress lacks the authority to regulate intrastate activity impacting species that have no commercial value and that exist entirely within a single state. 9 These arguments have gained a certain degree of traction, with respected jurists such as then-Judge John Roberts expressing doubt that "regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating 'Commerce • . . among the several States. '' ' . Currently, this remains the minority understanding, and all of the circuit courts hearing Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA have upheld the statute. However, they have failed to present a convincing account of how the ESA can be understood as economic regulation. 6 . See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-26 (2005) This Note argues that the ESA and other environmental statutes do address economic activity, although not in the various ways suggested by the circuit courts. Instead, I draw on environmental economics to argue that environmental statutes should be understood as a response to market failures. These market failures occur because environmental damage is likely to be an externality, environmental benefits are a public good, and environmental assets are frequently common resources. All too often, these factors lead rational people to engage in environmentally damaging behavior because it confers a net personal benefit, even though it imposes a net cost on society. On this account, the economic activity regulated by environmental statutes is the economic decision to pursue an activity despite its cost to society.
Part I explains how the Court's continued focus on distinguishing between economic and noneconomic activities threatens environmental regulation generally and the ESA in particular. It begins with a brief overview of the ESA and its legislative history. It then explores the growing importance of the economic inquiry in the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause cases. Part I concludes by assessing the ways in which lower courts have responded to this new doctrinal turn and focuses on their attempts to describe the ESA as regulation of economic activity.
In Part II, I propose a market failure approach as a more convincing way to identify the economic activity regulated by the ESA and other environmental statutes. Under this approach, courts should find that a statute regulates economic activity if Congress could have enacted the statute to address a market failure. The market failure approach would supplement, rather than replace, the Court's current Commerce Clause analysis. This approach draws on environmental economics literature, which explains environmental harm in economic terms. It translates this understanding into a doctrinal context, suggesting that environmental regulation is economic in nature because it changes commercial actors' economic calculations by requiring them to internalize the environmental externalities of their decisions. I present doctrinal support for this approach, identify its limitations, and demonstrate how it could be used to uphold the ESA.
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I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE THREAT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

A. The Endangered Species Act
When Congress enacted the ESA, it did so with very little debate and with overwhelming public support." The environmental movement was at its peak,' 2 and a nation of newfound environmentalists was eager to respond to well-publicized stories about threats to the bald eagle, blue whale, polar bear, and other "charismatic fauna."' 3 Endangered species already received some protection from statutes enacted in the prior decade, 1 4 but these statutes were limited in scope, and it soon became apparent that they were inadequate to prevent further extinctions." 5 Thus, in 1973 Congress adopted the ESA as a comprehensive approach to protecting threatened and endangered species throughout the nation. Congress relied chiefly on its Commerce Clause powers in passing the statute, 6 but the legislative history contains no explicit discussion of this constitutional authority. However, congressional findings and testimony suggest that Congress understood species extinctions as a problem with both commercial causes 1 7 and commercial consequences. 
13.
Id. at 23-24.
14. causal link between commercial activity and species extinction is particularly prominent in the legislative findings for the statute. There, Congress noted that "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation."" While this finding suggests that Congress understood economic activity to be a primary cause of species extinction, Congress did not choose to protect endangered species by directly regulating economic activity. Instead, the ESA prohibited any activity that would jeopardize the continued survival of threatened and endangered species.
E.g.,
The operative provisions of the statute reflect this focus on species rather than on the various activities that threaten them. Section 4 of the ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce to identify threatened and endangered species and to "list" such species. 2 " The Secretary is also required to designate critical habitat for each listed species. 21 Entire species are protected by section 7, which requires federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure that their actions will not jeopardize the continued survival of listed species." Individual members of threatened and endangered species are protected by section 9, which prohibits any person from taking, selling, importing, or exporting any protected species. 3 Section 9 applies to private actors as well as federal agencies,' and therefore it "raises the most concerns about the scope of congressional authority because it relies on the Commerce Clause to regulate all non-federal lands, including private property."" air and water face increasing danger from those entrepreneurs who find a profit in trapping and selling endangered animals.").
18
. Id. at 144 ("From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are potential resources."). 
Endangered Species
20.
Id. § 1533(c)(1). A species is endangered if it "is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range," id. § 1532(6), and a species is threatened if it "is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range," id. S 1532(20).
21.
Id. § 1533(a)(3).
22.
Id. S 1536(a)(2).
23.
Id. § 1538(a).
24.
Id. § § 1532(13), 1538(a ) .
2s.
Mank, supra note 16, at 941.
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For this reason, recent cases challenging the ESA have focused on section 9, arguing that the prohibition against species takes is unconstitutional as applied to private landowners. "Take" is a term of art that the ESA defines to mean "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or... attempt to engage in any such conduct. ' ,, 6 The prohibition against "harming" listed species has acquired particular significance. Department of Interior regulations define harm as "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife," including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering. with the result that individuals may commit illegal takes through development activities that alter the habitat of threatened or endangered species.
In the initial version of the ESA, Congress placed an extremely high value on endangered species. The statute prohibited any taking of threatened or endangered species, and it did not provide a mechanism for balancing other economic considerations against the value of preserving a species. enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost."
33
The Court's decision received significant media attention,' and Congress quickly responded by amending the ESA to include two mechanisms that allowed consideration of economic factors. 35 First, 1978 amendments to section 7 created the Endangered Species Committee, 36 a "God Squad" with the power to exempt projects from the ESA when the economic benefits of the project clearly outweigh the harm of the species loss.
3 7 Second, Congress changed section 4 to allow the Secretary to consider economic impact when deciding whether to designate an area as a critical habitat. 38 Thus, while still requiring private and public actors to recognize the social value of preserving endangered species, the ESA now contains mechanisms for weighing this social value against more immediate economic concerns. In sum, the ESA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to limit species extinctions. The legislative history of the statute suggests that Congress understood extinctions as a problem with diverse causes and even more diverse effects. As described below, courts hearing Commerce Clause challenges to the ESA have focused on the economic effects of extinction. 39 As this Section has demonstrated, however, there is a strong case to be made that Congress was at least as concerned with the economic causes of this phenomenon. Ultimately, attention to both economic causes and economic effects may be required if the ESA is to survive scrutiny under the Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine. The following Sections explore this doctrine and the threat it poses to the ESA.
B. The Supreme Court's Economic Requirement
For those concerned about the fate of environmental statutes and other social welfare legislation, 4° 42 In that case, the Court struck down federal legislation regulating the possession of guns in school zones, holding that this activity was too far removed from interstate commerce to fall under Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 43 In Lopez and subsequent cases, 44 the Court narrowed its interpretation of Congress's Commerce Clause authority by holding that this authority extends only to three categories of activity: the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
The ESA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and therefore post-Lopez Commerce Clause review of the statute would ask whether the ESA substantially affects interstate commerce. Lopez directed courts to answer this question by considering four factors: the economic character of the regulated activity, the presence of a jurisdictional element that would limit the statute's reach, legislative history linking the regulated activity with interstate commerce, and the strength of the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce.
4
" Of these four factors, the economic character of the regulated activity has proven the most elusive and the most significant.
In determining that the gun possession statute did not regulate economic activity, the Lopez Court did not explain what would make an activity "economic." Instead, it answered the economic question by comparing the statute with activities at issue in prior Commerce Clause cases. The Court noted that it had upheld congressional regulation of a variety of intrastate activities including coal mining, credit transactions, and discriminatory service in restaurants and hotels. 46 1 As in Lopez, the Court indicated that the noneconomic nature of the regulation was a key factor in holding that it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 2 The Court asserted that violent crimes motivated by gender animus were in no way economic, and it discounted congressional findings showing that these crimes had a negative impact on interstate commerce. 3 It also observed t' at "thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature." 4 As in Lopez, however, the Court did not explain how to determine whether an activity was "economic in nature."
The Court began to give substance to the economic inquiry in Gonzales v. Raich 5 a recent decision upholding the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as applied to medical marijuana users in California. In Raich, the Court concluded that this application of the CSA survived rational basis review, in part because the manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances are "quintessentially economic" activities. s6 To support this proposition, the Court cited a dictionary definition of "economics" as "the production, distribution, 
63.
In characterizing Wickard as a comprehensive scheme case, the Court blurred the distinction between activities surviving Commerce Clause review because of their aggregated effects and those surviving because they were part of a comprehensive scheme.
that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity." 6 " In sum, Raich suggests that when a court considers whether a challenged statute regulates economic activity, it should first determine whether the statute is part of a broader regulatory scheme. If so, the relevant activity for the economic inquiry is the larger class of activity regulated by that scheme, not the particular local activity at issue. This analysis provides guidance for a certain set of cases, but it still requires courts to determine if the larger class of activities is "economic."
One way to understand Raich is as a retreat from the Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence, thus reading Lopez and Morrison as mere aberrations." This interpretation of Raich has led some commentators to conclude that environmental statutes are no longer threatened by the Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence. For instance, in a post-Raich commentary, Michael Blumm and George Kimbrell wrote that "the Court's recent embracing of the comprehensive scheme rationale immunizes the ESA take provision from the sort of as-applied attacks property rights activists have previously brought against its application. '' 66 But this argument relies on the assumption that the Court would find the ESA as a whole to be a valid regulatory scheme. Blumm and Kimbrell are confident that it would:
The ESA is... a comprehensive regulatory scheme-aimed in part at preserving the economic benefits of biodiversity and avoiding economically destructive interstate competition-that would be fatally undercut if piecemeal species extinction was permitted simply because 64. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18. When the respondents attempted to distinguish their case from
Wickard by arguing that Roscoe Filburn was engaged in commercial activity, the Court insisted that Wickard involved noncommercial activity: "[E]ven though Filburn was indeed a commercial farmer, the activity he was engaged in-the cultivation of wheat for home consumption -was not treated by the Court as part of his commercial farming operation." Id. at 20. As Morrison showed, however, the fact that a statute may have economic benefits does not guarantee that it will survive constitutional scrutiny. 6 8 Furthermore, the promise of the comprehensive scheme approach should be balanced against the perils of Raich's narrow definition of "economics." The Court has repeatedly equated economic regulation with regulation of specific commodities, and this poses a serious threat to environmental regulation. Even a comprehensive regulatory scheme must have a close economic nexus to be valid Commerce Clause regulation." And the economic nexus requirement is where the ESA is most vulnerable.
65
C. The Lower Courts' Response
To understand why the ESA might not survive the Court's new Commerce Clause analysis, it is helpful to compare it to other environmental statutes that are more clearly economic in nature. For example, some environmental statutes can be characterized as economic regulation because they directly regulate commercial activity. In the easiest case, a challenged provision may contain a jurisdictional hook expressly limiting application of the statute to commercial endeavors. The D.C. Circuit relied on just such a jurisdictional hook to uphold the constitutionality of Clean Air Act provisions regulating emissions of volatile organic compounds. 7 ' The challenged provisions applied only to manufacturers, processors, distributors, importers, or suppliers of "consumer or commercial products for sale or distribution in interstate commerce in the United States. ' 71 The D.C. Circuit found that this jurisdictional limitation demonstrated the economic character of the regulated activity and also answered the distinct jurisdictional element inquiry.
72
Even when environmental statutes do not contain a jurisdictional hook, they may regulate specific activities that are easy to identify as part of (2000)).
71.
42 U.S.C. § 7 5 11b(e)(1)(C)(i). 82. 7 U.S.C. 
470
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In analyzing this application of the ESA, the Gibbs court identified the regulated activity as the taking of red wolves and offered two explanations for why this constituted economic activity. First, it observed that the taking of the wolves was motivated by economic concerns -the ranchers shot the wolves to protect their livestock. 88 Second, it found a direct relationship between the wolves and interstate commerce because if all the wolves were taken, there would be no wolf-related tourism, scientific research, or trade in pelts. 8 ' The Fourth Circuit's alternative reason for upholding the regulations was that they were enacted as part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 9° However, this explanation relied on the premise that "Congress undoubtedly has the constitutional authority to pass legislation for the conservation of endangered Each of Gibbs's alternative holdings fails as a general model for sustaining the ESA. The court was convincing in describing the taking of red wolves as economic activity and in linking this activity to interstate commerce, but its reasoning applies only to predators and commercially valuable species. Thus, it provides no defense for most applications of the ESA. In contrast, the court's remarks about the ESA as a comprehensive regulatory scheme could be an argument for upholding the statute, but the court failed to adequately support this argument.
While the Fourth Circuit focused on the economic nature of the taking itself, the D.C. Circuit has considered a variety of economic links but has ultimately upheld applications of the ESA because the activity leading to the taking was economic in nature. The D.C. Circuit first considered this question in National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 9 4 a 1997 case challenging the application of the ESA to construction activity that was determined to jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species. The species at issue in NAHB was the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly, an insect found only in a small area in Southern California. The two circuit judges who rejected this Commerce Clause challenge identified a number of ways in which the ESA could be considered economic regulation. 9 " Judge Wald looked to the potential commercial value of an endangered species 9 6 and the possibility of destructive interstate competition. 97 In contrast, Judge Henderson's reasoning focused on commercial impacts resulting from the interconnectedness of species in an ecosystem 9s and the commercial nature of the regulated development. 9 9 91. Id. S. 153, 194 (1978) By defining the regulated activity with reference to the construction project rather than to the endangered species, the Rancho Viejo court applied Lopez in a way that allowed it to uphold the ESA.1O 6 However, there are two problems with this approach. First, it is only useful in as-applied challenges in which the taking has occurred as part of a commercial activity. It leaves open the possibility that prohibiting noncommercial takings would be beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Second, it is difficult to distinguish this their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate species . . . will therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved in interstate commerce."). reasoning from that in Lopez.' 0 7 There, the defendant convicted under the GunFree School Zones Act (GFSZA)°8 brought the gun to the school as part of a gun sale.
10 9 If the ESA is constitutional when applied to commercial development that results in a taking, then the GFSZA should be constitutional when applied to the commercial activity of selling guns. l° That Lopez did not reach this result suggests that applications of a statute to commercial activity are not sufficient to make the statute "economic in nature." Finally, in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton,"' the Fifth Circuit stated that the relevant economic activity was the economic nature of the comprehensive regulatory scheme embodied in the ESA, but it offered only weak support for the contention that the "ESA's protection of endangered species is economic in nature." 1 2 In GDF Realty, developers sought to build housing and commercial developments on a parcel of land containing a network of caves. The caves were home to six endangered species of small invertebrates (the "cave species"). The developers sought declaratory relief holding that the application of the ESA to their proposed activity exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause." 3 The district court had rejected this challenge, observing that one of the proposed developments contained a Wal-Mart and noting that the court would be "hard-pressed to find a more direct link to interstate commerce than a Wal-Mart."" 4 On appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit rejected this approach, distinguishing between the regulated activity (the taking of species) and the nonregulated conduct leading to the activity (development)."' In holding that the substantial effects test should look only at the expressly regulated activity, the Fifth Circuit noted the two weaknesses mentioned in the above discussion of Rancho Viejo."' First, focusing on the nonregulated conduct "would allow application of otherwise unconstitutional 107. See Adler, supra note 3, at 409-10. While GDF Realty identified the key weaknesses of the conduct-based approach, it struggled to articulate an alternate explanation of how the ESA is economic regulation. The court rejected proposals that takes of the cave species alone had a substantial effect on interstate commerce based on the species' scientific interest or future commercial benefits."' Instead, it found that the regulation of cave species takes was an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme.
2 ' The court recognized that under this approach, "the larger regulation must be directed at activity that is economic in nature."'.. Insofar as it endorsed the comprehensive scheme approach and acknowledged the enduring importance of the economic inquiry, the Fifth Circuit would be vindicated by the Supreme Court's decision in Raich.
However, GDF Realty still could not answer the central question posed by these ESA cases: how can the ESA as a whole be understood as regulation of economic activity? The Fifth Circuit attempted to answer this question by observing that the ESA's drafters were concerned with the economic effects of species loss 122 and that most of the takes prohibited by the statute would occur in the course of economic activity. Yet neither of these considerations establishes that the ESA is economic regulation. First, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "[s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.
' 23 Second, as the GDF Realty court already recognized, the application of a statute to commercial actors is not sufficient to make the statute itself economic in nature. ' 1 4 Ultimately, then, all of these approaches fail to convincingly cast environmental protection as economic regulation. They also fail to distinguish environmental regulations from the statutes invalidated in Lopez and Morrison. Nonetheless, as I argue in the following Part, these environmental statutes can be understood as economic regulation: they responded to a concern that commercial actors pursued economic growth without due regard for environmental considerations. Though the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence requires courts to reconsider the economic underpinnings of the ESA and other environmental laws, this inquiry should not be fatal to the statutes. Because economic activity was understood as a primary cause of environmental devastation, legislation addressing this problem can fairly be characterized as regulation of economic activity.
II. THE MARKET FAILURE APPROACH: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS ECONOMIC REGULATION
In this Part, I propose that courts use a market failure approach to determine whether certain statutes regulate economic activity. Although the "economic" determination was a small piece of the analytic framework announced in Lopez, 2 s it has become the key factor in subsequent cases, and it poses the greatest challenge to arguments that environmental regulation is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority.12 6 The market failure approach suggests that when Congress enacts statutes correcting market failures, that legislation should be understood as economic in nature. Thus, it offers a way to think about economic activity that would allow courts to uphold environmental regulation as a constitutionally permissible response to the market failures that create environmental harm.
Application of the market failure approach would vary depending on how broadly a court defined the relevant market for Commerce Clause purposes. Under a broad definition of the market, 2 7 any factor perceived to be undervalued could be regarded as evidence of a market failure. 2 8 While this definition offers a way to uphold a variety of social welfare legislation under the Commerce Clause, it would also subject the market failure approach to the Supreme Court's concern about Commerce Clause analyses that make it "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power." ' 29 In contrast, a narrower version of the market failure approach would recognize market failures only when they have a direct impact on "an established .. interstate market." 3 ' In effect, it would only recognize market failures that result from the cost-benefit analyses of commercial actors in regional, national, or international markets. This approach would protect fewer regulations from Commerce Clause challenges, but it would also be easier to defend as consistent with Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. Below, I argue that courts should use the narrow market failure approach to uphold environmental statutes as valid Commerce Clause legislation. I begin by explaining how the interaction of environmental and economic concerns led a generation of environmental economists to describe environmental harm as a market failure. I then translate this insight into a doctrinal argument for upholding environmental statutes as regulations of market activity. Finally, I analyze the ESA under the proposed market failure approach, concluding that even the ESA-arguably the most far-reaching piece of environmental regulation-should be upheld as constitutional Commerce Clause regulation because it addresses market failures.
A. Environmental Harm as a Market Failure
Since the 196os, scholars and policymakers have often analyzed environmental problems through an economic lens. Economist William Baxter expressed a common sentiment when he wrote in 1974 that "environmental problems are economics problems, and better insight can be gained by application of economic analysis. fundamental problem with the unthinking application of economic valuation to determine the scope of primary restoration is that the theory of economic value treats social objectives like commodities and expects public policy to serve as a transmission belt for relatively uninformed and unreflective consumer preferences.").
thinking about environmental policy. 133 This development makes it particularly ironic that courts have struggled to identify the economic elements of environmental regulation. Instead of reinventing the wheel, courts should draw on the rich literature of environmental economics, which explains how rational economic decision-making can lead to disastrous environmental outcomes.
From an economic perspective, environmental damage can often be explained as the inefficient use of environmental goods due to market failure. 3 4 This understanding reflects economic theories about the relationship between markets and social welfare. As a matter of public policy, the allure of a freemarket system is the promise that when each individual pursues his or her own interests, the aggregate individual activity will promote the public interest.
5
Theorems of welfare economics stipulate conditions necessary for this to occur: "(1) a complete set of markets with well-defined property rights exists... ; (2) consumers and producers behave competitively by maximising benefits and minimising costs; (3) market prices are known by all consumers and firms; and (4) transaction costs are zero so that charging prices does not consume resources.' ' 6 When one or more of these conditions is not met, a market failure may result in the inefficient allocation of resources. Key sources of market failures include externalities, public goods and commons problems, and 133. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 24 ( 4 th ed. 2003) ("Because economic concepts and terminology are so prevalent in this field, it is vital that everyone approaching environmental law be conversant with those concepts and terminology -if only so that criticism of them can be informed and astute."). (describing market failures as an underlying cause of environmental harms).
See generally Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth, in
This is the invisible hand theory that Adam Smith laid out in The Wealth of Nations:
[E]very individual ... generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1776).
NICK HANLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 24 (1997).
monopolies.' 3 7 All of these, except monopolies, frequently occur in environmental contexts.' For instance, environmental damage is often described as an externality, a cost that is imposed on society at large rather than internalized by the individual causing the damage. ' Industrial pollution is a common example of an environmental externality.
4
Because the benefits of pollution control measures are shared by society at large, while the costs of these measures are imposed on the polluter, the rational individual polluter will continue to pollute unless forced to internalize the costs of pollution. As Professors Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey have explained, "Since individuals in a market system respond only to the benefits and costs that they actually receive and pay for, the market system may be inadequate to deal with externalities."' 4 '
The public good nature of many environmental assets is another cause of environmental market failures. Public goods are assets that are nonrival and nonexcludable, meaning that they are "available to all and one person's consumption does not reduce another person's consumption. 139. E.g., Esty, supra note 134, at 1503-04 ("All too often, prices in the marketplace do not capture the social costs . .. of pollution .... As a result, both companies and individuals shift environmental costs that they generate onto others or society at large. These externalities must be internalized if the market is to produce efficient outcomes."). (1999) ("Environmental regulation is necessary from an economic standpoint because it corrects for the market's failure to internalize the costs of pollution or to generate an efficient amount of public goods such as clean air.").
140.
because they are already provided at no cost. This creates the potential for freerider problems: people may conceal their interest in the good to avoid paying for it, with the ultimate result that the good is provided at less-than-efficient levels. 145 Commons problems arise when it is difficult or impossible to deny access to a resource. ' 4 6 The classic commons contains desirable natural resources and is an open access area, available for use by all.1 4 7 Commons are vulnerable to overexploitation because individuals have no way to capture the benefits of measured extraction and therefore are likely to destroy the resource by using it at unsustainable levels. For instance, over-fishing can destroy the population of commercially valuable fish in a given area.' 4 ' Because no fisherman owns a specific piece of the ocean, any one fisherman's attempt to conserve fish would be defeated by competition from other fishermen, who would take the remaining fish. As H. Scott Gordon explained in 1954, "Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he who is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use will only find that it has been taken by another." 1 49
While externalities, public goods, and commons are analytically distinct concepts, they implicate the same basic problem: when public costs and private costs diverge, private decisions are likely to lead to inefficient resource use. As Garrett Hardin explained in The Tragedy of the Commons,' s0 the net effect of a series of such decisions can lead to unsustainable use that has both public and private consequences. In the 196os and 197os, Hardin's essay and other accounts of environmental damage"' 1 began to influence federal legislators, 145. Id.
146.
Id. at 37.
147. The term "commons" and early descriptions of the commons suggested a choice between two systems of property ownership: private property or common property. As James Acheson and others have observed, however, there is a significant distinction between communally owned property and open access property. When property is communally owned, the joint owners are likely to develop rules for resource exploitation, thereby avoiding the tragedy of the commons. who started to craft environmental laws designed to regulate activities that had historically ignored environmental factors. Members of Congress lamented the "failure to foresee and control the untoward consequences of modern technology," including "the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers, the smog from automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains, and the destruction of topsoil by strip mining."' 5 2 One way Congress responded to these market failures was by trying to force the internalization of externalities.' 3 For instance, congressional testimony in the 196os and 1970s identified interstate pollution spillovers as a key reason why federal environmental regulation was necessary, 4 and Congress responded by establishing national pollution guidelines in the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. As one court interpreting the Clean Water Act observed:
[T] he primary purpose of the effluent limitations and guidelines was to provide uniformity among the federal and state jurisdictions enforcing the NPDES program and prevent the "Tragedy of the Commons" that might result if jurisdictions can compete for industry and development by providing more liberal limitations than their neighboring states."' 5 Soon, however, Congress began to focus on environmental damage as an externality imposed not just by states, but also by commercial entities. Recognizing that the decision to pollute in the first place was also a problem of externalities, Congress crafted legislation that imposed economic penalties on pollution, thus requiring polluters either to avoid producing pollution or to internalize its costs." 56 While theories about markets, commons, and externalities have been incorporated into environmental law and have spawned a rich body of literature about environmental law and policy, this Note is concerned only with the fundamental predicate of these theories: that when individuals and businesses decide to engage in a particular activity, the private costs and benefits of that activity may differ from the public costs and benefits." 5 7 In this situation, the invisible hand of the market fails to align individual self-interest with broader social interests, and the government may need to intervene to ensure public welfare.'s The intervention could take a variety of formscommand-and-control regulation, permit systems, incentive programs, pollution taxes, or compensation for victims of pollution. ' 9 Or the government could decide that the costs of intervention are greater than the costs imposed by the negative externality and that therefore the best course of action is no action at all. 6 o Which response is best is a policy question, but in our system of enumerated powers, the authority of the federal government to respond at all is a legal question.
Under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the answer to that legal question depends in part on whether the government is regulating economic activity. As the above discussion indicates, in a free-market system, there are many circumstances in which people profit by measuring the environmental costs of their activities in terms of individual cost rather than social cost. This cost asymmetry is a market failure, and congressional action to address the market failure should be understood as regulation of economic activity.
B. Doctrinal Support for a Market Failure Analysis
The proposed market failure approach fits within the Court's new Commerce Clause doctrine by offering a way to determine whether a statute is economic in nature. The market failure approach is compatible with Lopez and Morrison, in which the Court provided little guidance about how to determine whether a statute regulates economic activity.1 6 Furthermore, while it would 157. LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 134, at 33 ("Environmental problems occur because individuals using the commons do not bear the full social costs of their actions.").
158
. See, e.g., id. ("Economics provides strong support for some form of collective action to correct market failures and to provide public goods like environmental protection."); Esty, supra note 134, at 1503 ("Where, however, private costs, which are the basis for market decisions, deviate from social ones, market failures occur, resulting in allocative inefficiency in general and suboptimal resource consumption or pollution levels in particular.").
159.
See, e.g., Engel, supra note 143, at 254-57 (identifying marketable permits, government subsidies, and pollution taxes as three incentive-based responses to environmental harm). expand Raich's proposed definition of economics,1 6 2 this approach shares with Raich the conviction that economic activity should be understood with reference to markets. In Raich, the Court attempted to understand economic activity with reference to commodities that have market value. The market failure approach widens the frame of analysis and looks at the decision-making processes that lead to the ultimate manner in which commodities are produced, distributed, and consumed. Because the market failure analysis is concerned with the moment of decision, rather than the end result of a decision, it is cognizant of goods and services whose value is not fully reflected by the market. However, the underlying inquiry is the same-the market failure analysis, like the commodity-based analysis, is concerned with determining whether an activity affects the way that a market functions.
At root, the market failure approach depends on the premise that Congress can use its Commerce Clause authority to regulate market functioning. Doctrinal support for this premise is available from two lines of cases. First, a variety of Commerce Clause cases have upheld statutes that regulated markets in response to market failures. Second, dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest that a key function of the Commerce Clause is to maintain smoothly functioning national markets and thereby prevent the market failures that result from state acts of economic protectionism. While neither line of jurisprudence directly establishes that statutes responding to market failures are sufficiently "economic" to fall within the Commerce Clause powers, taken together they provide substantial indirect support for this proposition.
Of all Commerce Clause legislation, the Sherman Antitrust Act is perhaps the clearest example of market failure regulation. The Sherman Act regulates monopolies, which often occur when commercial actors seek to increase their profits by establishing exclusive control over a market.1 6 3 Monopolies eliminate the pressure for competitive pricing and harm consumers through higher prices. The legislative history of the Sherman Act does not identify the specific harms Congress sought to address, and Congress's intent in passing the Act is 163. The Sherman Act makes it a felony for any person to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. a topic of debate.' 64 However, a dominant strain of antitrust scholarship treats the Sherman Act as a response to the inefficiencies created by monopolies.
,
The Supreme Court has endorsed this approach in antitrust cases, 66 supporting the proposition that the best way to understand the Sherman Act is as market failure legislation. While the Sherman Act was designed to regulate monopolies that were perceived to be beyond the power of the states to control, 6 7 the Act was soon applied to intrastate monopolies as well. In response to early Commerce Clause challenges to the Sherman Act, the Court upheld the application of the Act to local stock trades that would eliminate competition between railroad companies 68 and to a purely intrastate monopoly. 69 Because these challenges to the Sherman Act did not allege that the Act failed to regulate economic activity, the Court's holdings do not establish conclusively that market failure regulation constitutes economic regulation. However, they do confirm that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate at least some market failures.
Other cases support the application of the market failure approach to legislation that extends beyond purely economic areas. simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses." 1 77 In its concern with preserving fair competition and nationwide markets, "the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence might be said to embrace a pro-competition stance, consistent with the ideology and goals of the neoclassical economics framework, in which law sees its primary role as intervening to correct for market failure.' ' 1 78 Thus, while dormant Commerce Clause cases do not speak directly to the constitutional limits on congressional powers, they do suggest that market failures are an appropriate subject of congressional regulation.
In sum, the idea that Congress can regulate certain market failures has been a background principle in cases decided during all eras of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Using this principle to guide the "economic" inquiry maintains the Lopez framework for examining substantial effects, and it builds on existing Commerce Clause precedent.
C. Defending the Market Failure Approach
The market failure approach is consistent with background principles of Commerce Clause analysis, but if it is to sustain environmental statutes in the courts it must also conform to the requirements of Lopez, Morrison, and Raich. In this regard, the primary conceptual challenge to the market failure approach is identifying a limiting principle. As economic theories have colonized diverse realms of legal analysis,' 79 scholars have used market principles to explain an increasingly broad set of legal issues.1s This development threatens to render the market failure approach meaningless by suggesting that anything valued in a market system is economic and that anything not valued is an externality indicating a market failure. 179. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 137, at 3 ("Like the rabbit in Australia, economics found a vacant niche in the 'intellectual ecology' of the law and rapidly filled it.").
i8o. See Bush, supra note 127, at 1io8 ("[T]he appeal of economics' logical neatness and general theories has led to its increasing prominence in law...." (footnote omitted)).
However, the above concern is particular to the broad market failure approach. In contrast, the narrower approach maintains the link between market failures and interstate commerce by looking for market failures that take place in the context of "an established .. interstate market."1' Thus, the narrower approach requires not only that there be a market failure, but also that the market failure be traced to the economic decisions of commercial actors. Under the narrow market failure approach, when there is evidence that commercial actors engage in economic calculations in a way that undervalues the social cost of their activities, Congress should be able to regulate that behavior.
Perhaps the most useful test of the market failure approach is to apply it to the facts of Lopez and Morrison. As discussed in Section I.C, a fundamental problem with most of the circuit court cases upholding environmental statutes is that their logic would also uphold the statutes invalidated in Lopez and Morrison. In contrast, the narrow market failure approach offers a way to distinguish environmental statutes from the GFSZA and VAWA. Like environmental statutes, these statutes were arguably concerned with social cost, and the crimes they sought to prevent can be understood as market failures.1 8 2 Much of the social cost of environmental damage, however, results from commercial actors' failure to account for environmental costs in their pursuit of profit. In contrast, there is no indication that Congress understood the problem of gun violence as resulting from commercial actors' failure to value either guns or the victims of gun violence. Similarly, VAWA did not treat gender-motivated violence as a problem caused by profit-seeking behavior.1 8 3 Of these three kinds of regulation, only environmental regulation is commonly understood as addressing a problem caused in large part by the profit-seeking activities of commercial actors. 265 (1982) (describing the public interest theory of legislation as conceiving "both the ideal and the actual function of legislation to be to increase economic welfare by correcting market failures such as crime and pollution").
183. To the contrary, Congress was focused on establishing the economic effects of violence against women, and the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress was concerned that these economic effects were not recognized at all, not that they were inappropriately valued.
184. Of course, neither the GFSZA nor VAWA was analyzed under the market failure approach. It is possible to describe the statutes as a response to market failures, and a court employing highly deferential rational basis review and applying the broad market failure analysis could have upheld them under this theory.
One way to understand the distinction between environmental statutes and the criminal statutes invalidated in Lopez and Morrison is by considering the particular types of market failures at issue. The market failure associated with crime can be understood as a problem of public goods. Public safety, like national defense, is best understood as a nonrival and nonexclusive good. In theory, people can benefit from public safety services without indicating their willingness to pay, and one person's use of these services does not necessarily make them less available for another person. Thus, while gun possession in a school zone or gender-motivated crimes may represent market failures, they are not market failures that can be traced to commercial actors. In contrast, while some environmental problems can be explained in terms of public goods, most environmental regulation is targeted at the aspects of environmental damage that result from commercial actors' failure to internalize externalities or their tendency to overuse the commons.
In sum, the Commerce Clause authority over economic activity should be understood to give Congress the authority to address market failures. However, this authority is still limited by the other requirements of the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause framework. The market failure approach is only useful in determining whether a statute regulates economic activity. For that statute to be held constitutional, a court would still need to consider the other Lopez factors and make a subsequent decision about whether the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. The following Section explores the application of the market failure analysis within the larger Lopez framework.
D. Evaluating the Endangered Species Act as a Response to Market Failures
The most persuasive attacks on the Endangered Species Act have been made by private developers asserting that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to regulate intrastate activities that threaten noncommercial species.' These cases present as-applied challenges to section 9 of the ESA, which prohibits "any person" from "taking" a species that is listed as threatened or endangered;,86 action that modifies or degrades critical habitat for a listed species is understood to harm that species and therefore constitutes a take.' 8 7 This is why development activity is the source of so many ESA challenges-the process of developing land triggers the ESA if it jeopardizes a species's survival by destroying its habitat. As discussed in Section L.C, although the circuit courts have upheld the ESA in the face of these attacks, they have not been able to articulate a convincing rationale for their decisions. This Section demonstrates how the market failure approach would give courts a more logically coherent and doctrinally faithful way to uphold these applications of the ESA.
A court hearing such a challenge would begin with Lopez's three-pronged test. This type of challenge is about purely intrastate activity that does not implicate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. A court would consider the challenge under the third prong of Lopez and ask whether the regulation was within congressional "power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
' 188 Following Lopez, a court should make this determination by considering the four factors discussed earlier: the economic nature of the regulated activity, the presence of a jurisdictional hook, the legislative history of the statute, and the degree of attenuation between the activity and interstate commerce.189 Because the ESA is a comprehensive regulatory scheme, '90 the economic inquiry should be directed at the larger class of activity regulated by the ESA, rather than any particular application of the challenged statute.' 9 ' Thus, an initial task of the Commerce Clause analysis is to identify the class of activity regulated by the ESA. In Raich, the Court characterized the Controlled Substances Act as regulating the activities involved in producing, distributing, and consuming commodities traded in an interstate market.1 92 At a similar level of generality, the ESA might be described as regulating the pursuit of economic growth that disregards the national value of threatened and endangered species. (2000) (finding that threatened and endangered "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people").
While the comprehensive scheme approach helps identify the relevant activity, a court would still need to determine whether there is a rational basis for finding that this class of activity substantially affects interstate commerce. This is the point at which a court would undertake the economic inquiry and at which the market failure analysis becomes relevant. Under the narrow market failure approach, a court should find that a statute regulates economic activity if the statute corrects a market failure by regulating the behavior of commercial actors in the marketplace.
The ESA would survive this inquiry. Congress enacted the ESA in response to findings that the extinction of particular species was due to economic growth without regard to conservation. 194 The market failure described by these findings is the divergence between the social costs and individual costs of economic growth-Congress found that commercial actors placed too little value on endangered species. 95 This market failure can be explained as a problem of externalities. A developer whose activity eliminates a particular species receives all of the profit of the development but bears only a fraction of the social cost of eliminating the species. The remaining cost is an externality that is imposed on society at large. The ESA internalizes this externality by mandating that commercial actors increase the value that they place on listed species. Thus, the precise economic activity regulated by the ESA is the costbenefit analysis in which developers assign to species loss a lower value than that assigned to it by society at large.
The economic inquiry is the primary obstacle to sustaining the ESA as constitutional Commerce Clause legislation. After using the market failure approach to determine that the ESA regulates economic activity, a court would have little difficulty concluding that the regulated activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce. Although the ESA does not contain a jurisdictional hook, the legislative history links environmental protection with economic activity in a way that supports finding that a substantial effect exists. In cases involving developers and other commercial actors, the above analysis would be sufficient to establish congressional authority to regulate their activity. However, the market failure approach could also be combined with the comprehensive scheme analysis to uphold the ESA in response to a challenge involving noncommercial actors. While it is important that Congress have a rational basis for expecting the statute to change commercial actors' market behavior, it is not necessary that it regulate only commercial actors. ' 
9
8 If commercial actors were prevented from taking endangered species but private actors were not, there would be immense pressure for individual landowners to "shoot, shovel and shut up,"' 9 9 in the hope that this would make their land more attractive to developers. In order to make regulation of governmental and commercial actors effective, Congress might well have thought it needed to regulate more broadly to prevent noncommercial species takes from undermining the regulatory goal. 2 "' As a historical matter, the legislative history of the ESA shows that the need for comprehensive legislation was in fact one of the key reasons that Congress enacted the statute.
1
Ultimately, then, the market failure analysis supports upholding the ESA as constitutionally permissible Commerce Clause legislation. This approach explains how the ESA is economic regulation, and, in combination with the comprehensive scheme analysis applied in Raich, it supports upholding the statute as applied to both commercial and noncommercial actors.
site waste disposal was an economic activity because "to the extent a chemical plant can dispose of its waste on-site free of regulation, it would have a market advantage over chemical companies that lack on-site disposal options." Id. The court explained that the aggregate effects of this kind of market advantage could lead to a substantial effect on interstate commerce by altering "economic conditions in the chemical industry. 
